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Greenburg: Juvenile Miranda Waiver

LEARNING DISABLED
JUVENILES & MIRANDA RIGHTS
- WHAT CONSTITUTES

VOLUNTARY, KNOWING, &
INTELLIGENT WAIVER
Steven A. Greenburg*

I. INTRODUCTION

In 1986, the United States Supreme Court in Colorado v.
Connellyl held that under a due process analysis,2 police coercion is a prerequisite to involuntary waiver of Miranda 3 rights.·
• J.D. Golden Gate University School of Law, 1992; M.A.T. Beloit College, 1980;
B.A. Beloit College, 1979. The author taught learning disabled children for 10 years and
served as director of a private learning disabilities clinic for 7 years. I express my appreciation to Sheila Reed, Professor Peter Keane, Professor Michael Zamperini, and Paula
Ohliger for their editorial contributions toward this article. I also thank Information Express, Alice Kanter, and Angela Macfarlane for supplying supplemental research material. A special thanks to Debi Greenburg for her continual support, both editorial and
motivational. Finally, thank you Victor Greenburg.
l. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § l.
3. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
4. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986) (In Connelly, the adult defendant was a chronic
schizophrenic, who, while experiencing "command hallucinations," walked up to a police
officer, waived his Miranda rights, and spontaneously confessed to a murder. He then
confessed two more times after being given Miranda warnings. The Colorado Supreme
Court upheld the trial court determination that due to defendant's mental disorder, his
first spontaneous confession was involuntary despite the absence of police coercion because he lacked rational intellect and free will. The Colorado Supreme Court also agreed
with the trial court that defendant's Mirandized confessions were also invalid because
his waiver was not the result of free and intelligent choice, thus were involuntary. People
v. Connelly, 702 P.2d 722, 729 (Colo. 1985). On review, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed
the Colorado judgment, holding that voluntariness under the Fourteenth Amendment's
Due Process Clause requires only that a confession not be causally related to police coercion. Connelly, 479 U.S. at 167. The Court stated that voluntariness inquiries into the
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This article explores whether Connelly is controlling under federal and California law where a juvenile waives Miranda rights,
but lacks sufficient cognitive ability to understand those rights
and the consequences of waiving them.
The Connelly holding leaves unsettled three issues relating
to Miranda waivers. First, it is unclear under Connelly whether
a person must have sufficient cognitive abilities to voluntarily
waive Miranda rights. Connelly explicitly holds that police coercion must be causally connected to involuntary waiver under a
due process analysis. 1I Yet the majority opinion includes in its
voluntariness analysis the determination that the Connelly defendant's mental illness did not significantly impair his cognitive
abilities, thus he understood his rights when he waived them. s
Connelly may therefore be factually distinguished from a case
where the accused lacks sufficient cognitive abilities to understand Miranda rights. Thus, juveniles whose cognitive abilities
are impaired by learning disabilities may be outside the Connelly decision.
The second issue unresolved by Connelly is whether the voluntariness standard requiring coercion leaves intact the possibility that a Miranda waiver may be invalid if it is not knowing
and intelligent. 7 Subsequent decisions 8 and commentary 9 suggest
defendant's state of mind separate from official coercion should be resolved by state evidence rules relating to reliability; such matters are not governed by the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause. [d. at 166-67).
5. [d.
6. [d. at 161-62.

7. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444 (waiver must be "made voluntarily, knowingly, intelligently."); Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986) (inquiry into Miranda waiver has
two distinct dimensions.
First, the relinquishment of the right must have been voluntary in the sense that it was the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception.
Second, the waiver must have been made with a full awareness
of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it. Only if the 'totality of
the circumstances surrounding the interrogation' reveals both
an uncoerced choice and the requisite level of comprehension
may a court properly conclude that the Miranda rights have
been waived.
(citing Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 725 (1979))).
8. See Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986); Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564,
573 (1987); Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 292 & nA (1988); Michigan v. Harvey, 110
S. Ct. 1176. 1179 (1990); Illinois v. Perkins. 110 S. Ct. 2394 (1990); Illinois v. Bernasco.
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that the knowing and intelligent requirement remains intact
subsequent to Connelly. It is also unclear whether the knowing
and intelligent requirement, if it survives Connelly, is based on
Fifth Amendment rights 10 or is dependent solely on state rules
of evidence. l l If the requirement is based on Fifth Amendment
rights, states would be required to analyze the validity of Miranda waivers in terms of whether the waiver was knowing and
intelligent, and, if coercion was present, whether it was voluntary. One court, the Supreme Court of Illinois, has already taken
this approach. 12
The third issue regarding post-Connelly Miranda waivers is
whether the coercion standard applied to the adult Connelly defendant applies with equal force to juvenile offenders. In the
1967 In re Gault decision,13 the Supreme Court defined juvenile
waiver standards under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.
As a result of the Gault holding, COUtts apply heightened scrutiny when reviewing waivers and confessions by juveniles as
compared to adults to ensure that such juvenile waivers and
confessions are voluntary.14
The specific factual issue addressed in this article is
whether the federal waiver standards announced in Connelly require California courts, absent police coercion, to admit the confession of a learning disabled juvenile who waives Miranda
138 Ill. 2d 349, 562 N.E.2d 958 (1990).
9. Berger, Compromise and Continuity: Miranda Waivers, Confession Admissibility, and the Retention of Interrogation Protections, 49 U. PIIT. L. REV. 1007, 1042-54
(1988); Note, Colorado v. Connelly: The Demise of Free Will as an Independent Basis
for Finding a Confession Involuntary, 33 VILL. L. REV. 895, 920-22 (1988).
10. U.S. CONST. amend. V (in a criminal case, right against self-incrimination, and
not be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law).
11. Berger, supra note 9, at 1042-54 ("whether a suspect who establishes that he
lacks awareness of his Miranda rights, despite receiving a full warning, can still execute a
valid waiver consistent with the fifth amendment"); Connelly, 479 U.S. at 166-67 (1986)
(Inquiries into the state of mind of the criminal defendant who has confessed, separate
from any coercion brought to bear on the defendant by the state, should be resolved by
state laws governing the admission of evidence. The U.S. Constitution creates no standard of its own in this area.).
12. Illinois v. Bernasco, 138 Ill. 2d 349, 562 N.E.2d 958 (1990).
13. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
14. Id. at 55 ("We appreciate that special problems may arise with respect to waiver
of the privilege by or on behalf of children." If counsel was not present, "the greatest
care must be taken to assure that the admission was voluntary, in the sense not or.ly that
it was not coerced or suggested, but also that it was not the product of ignorance of
rights or of adolescent fantasy, fright, or despair.").
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rights yet lacks sufficient cognitive ability to understand the
rights and consequences of waiving them. Juveniles are unlikely
to understand either the rights waived or the consequences of
waiving them. II! Strong statistical evidence supports the conclusion that a learning disabled juvenile may lack sufficient cognitive abilities to voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waive
Miranda rights. I6 For example, learning disabled juveniles usually have deficient language and communication skillsP Consequently, it is plausible that cognitive deficiencies resulting from
these deficient language and communication skills would impair
effective Miranda waivers. IS In addition, a disproportionate ratio
of adjudicated juveniles have been diagnosed as learning disabled. I9 This link between juvenile crime and learning disabilities 20 supports the conclusion that learning disabilities should be
a significant factor in determining the validity of juvenile Miranda waivers.
II. EVOLUTION OF THE "VOLUNTARINESS" STANDARD FOR WAIVER OF MIRANDA RIGHTS UNDER FEDERAL LAW
The United States Supreme Court, in Brown v. Mississippi,21 held for the first time that a coerced confession violated
the due process requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment of
the United States Constitution. 22 The Court applied the funda15. Id. See, e.g., infra note 18.
16. See infra notes 17-19.
17. See Gibbs & Cooper, Prevalence of Communication Disorders in Students with
Learning Disabilities, 22 J. OF LEARNING DISABILITIES 60 (January 1989); Marge, PRINCIPALS OF CHILDHOOD LANGUAGE DISABILITIES 75-98 (1972); Newcomer & Magee, The Performance of Learning (Reading) Disabled Children on a Test of Spoken Language, THE
READING TEACHER 899-900 (1977).
18. Even non-learning disabled juveniles are unlikely to knowingly and intelligently
waive Miranda rights because they do not understand the nature and significance of
their rights. See Ferguson & Douglas, A Study of Juvenile Waiver, 7 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
39 (1970); Grisso, Juveniles' Capacity to Waive Miranda Rights: An Empirical Analysis, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 1134 (1980).
19. McKay & Brumback, Relationship Between Learning Disabilities and Juvenile
Delinquency, 51 PERCEPTUAL & MOTOR SKILLS 1223-26 (1980); Murray, The Link Between Learning Disabilities and Juvenile Delinquency: Current Theory and Knowledge,
No. 244-819 U. S. GOV'T PRINTING OFFICE (1977).
20. See infra note 19.
21. Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
22. Id. at 287.

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol21/iss3/2

4

Greenburg: Juvenile Miranda Waiver

1991]

JUVENILE MIRANDA WAIVER

491

mental rights 23 of the Fourteenth Amendment and found that
Brown's confession was coerced. 24 Two years later, in Johnson u.
Zerbst,u> the Court held that waiver of the right to counsel must
reflect an "intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a
known right or privilege."26
In Rogers u. Richmond,27 the Court expanded on Brown,
stating that due process requires that a confession must be voluntary28 as well as uncoerced. 29 The Court continued to define
voluntariness standards in Townsend u. Sain.30 The Townsend
Court stated that a critical factor in determining the voluntariness of a confession is whether the confession resulted from the
accused's "free and rational choice."31 The Supreme Court in
Haynes u. Washington 32 stated that the voluntariness of a confession must be examined in the totality of the circumstances. 33
The Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination
was made applicable to the States through the Fourteenth
Amendment in Malloy u. Hogan. 34 Subsequently, the Court in
Miranda u. Arizona 311 developed warnings 36 to advise an accused
of their Sixth Amendment37 right to counsel and Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. 38 The Miranda Court held
23. Palco v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937) (C. J. Cardozo defined fundamental
rights as those rights which are implicit in the concept of ordered liberty. Id. at 324).
24.Id.
25. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
26. Id. at 464.
27. Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 (1961).
28. Id. at 540. See also Columbe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568 (1961).
29. Rogers, 365 U.S. at 540 (1961).
30. Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
31. Id. at 307, 321 (In Townsend, police inadvertently gave the suspect a drug for
his sickness which also had the effect of a truth serum. The police were unaware of the
drug's effects and obtained a confession. The confession was held inadmissible because it
was not the product of a free intellect.). See, e.g., Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219
(1941).
32. Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963).
33. Id. at 513.
34. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
35. Miranda, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
36. Id. at 467-76 (Warnings include the right to remain silent, an explanation that
anything said can be used against the accused in court, the right to consult with counsel
and to have counsel present during the interrogation, if the accused cannot afford an
attorney one will be appointed to represent them, if the accused chooses to answer questions after the warning they may end the interrogation at any time.).
37. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
38.Id.
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that the prosecution has a heavy burden to show that waiver of
rights contained in the Miranda warnings was made voluntarily,
knowingly, and intelligently.39 If the state fails to meet this burden, the waiver is invalid. 40
The Supreme Court concluded that juveniles are entitled to
the same rights to counsel and self-incrimination as adults in In
re Gault. 41 The Gault Court recognized the special vulnerability
of juveniles during police interrogations. 42 The Gault Court
stated that although juveniles can waive their rights, such waivers must be closely examined for voluntariness. 43 After the Gault
decision, juvenile courts apply additional scrutiny in analyzing
the voluntariness of juvenile waivers and confessions as compared to the scrutiny applied to adults."
In Brewer u. Williams 4ll the Court held that for a waiver of
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel to be valid, in addition to
understanding the right to counsel, an individual also must intend to relinquish it.46 Although Brewer was decided on Sixth
Amendment grounds regarding waiver of the right to counsel,47
the same test arguably applies in determining the validity of a
waiver of Fifth Amendment Miranda rights: whether the accused not only understood the right to remain silent, but also
intended to relinquish that right. 4s Under the Brewer analysis, a
39. Id. at 457.
40.Id.
41. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
42. Id. at 14-18.
43. [d. at 55. See also notes 9, 18.
44. Id. at 55.
45. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977).
46. [d. at 403 (The proper standard in determining the question of waiver as a matter of federal constitutional law is that the State must prove "an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege." (citing Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S.
at 464».
47. Brewer, 430 U.S. 387 (1977).
48. See Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 292 (1988). In Patterson, the Court
stated: "In the past, this Court has held that a waiver of the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel is valid only when it reflects 'an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a
known right or privilege.' " Id. (citing Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. at 401, 404 (1977);
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938» ("In other words, the accused must 'kno[w)
what he is doing' so that 'his choice is made with his eyes open.' "). Id. (citing Adams v.
McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 279 (1942» ("In a case arising under the Fifth Amendment, we
described this requirement as 'a full awareness [of) both the nature of the right being
abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it.' "). Id. (citing Moran v.
Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986» ("We now fil'ld a strong similarity between the level of
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juvenile's waiver of the right to remain silent would be invalid if
it were shown that the juvenile's learning disability precluded
understanding of the right waived.
In Fare v. Michael C.49 the Court considered whether a juvenile had knowingly and voluntarily waived Miranda rights. IIO
The Court held that the totality of the circumstances determines whether a juvenile voluntarily and knowingly waived Miranda rights and therefore the waiver was valid. III Factors to be
considered when inquiring into the totality of the circumstances
surrounding the interrogation include the juvenile's age, experience, education, background, intelligence and whether they have
the capacity to understand the nature of the warnings given
him, the nature of their Fifth Amendment rights, and the consequences of waiving those rights. 52 Thus, the Fare court impliedly supports the position that a learning disability, if a significant factor in the totality of the circumstances surrounding
the interrogation, may preclude a valid juvenile waiver.
In Moran v. Burbine,53 the Court found the adult defendant's waiver of the right to counsel valid, holding that events
occurring without the defendant's knowledge have "no bearing
on the capacity to comprehend and knowingly relinquish a conknowledge a defendant must have to waive his Fifth Amendment right to counsel, and
the protection accorded to Sixth Amendment rights."). [d. at 298, n.12. (citing Comment,
Constitutional Law - Rights to Counsel, 49 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 399, 409 (1981)).
49. Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707 (1979) (In Fare, a sixteen and one-half year old
juvenile was taken into custody on suspicion of murder. He was Mirandized before questioning. At the outset of questioning, the defendant asked to speak with his probation
officer. Police denied his request and defendant agreed to talk with the officers without
consulting an attorney. After implicating himself, he was charged in juvenile court with
the murder. Defendant claimed his incriminating statements violated Miranda because
his request to see his probation officer constituted an invocation of his Fifth Amendment
right to remain silent. The trial court admitted the statements, holding that defendant
waived his right to remain silent notwithstanding his request to see his probation officer.
The California Supreme Court reversed, holding defendant's request to see his probation
officer was a per se invocation of his Fifth Amendment rights in the same way as if he
had requested an attorney. The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that on
the totality of the circumstances, defendant voluntarily and knowingly waived his Fifth
Amendment rights.).
50. [d. at 724 (citing North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373 (1979)) (In Butler,
the Court inquired "whether the defendant has knowingly and voluntarily waived the
rights delineated in the Miranda case.").
51. [d. at 725.
52. [d. (emphasis added).
53. Moran, 475 U.S. 412 (1986).
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stitutional right."II. The Moran Court applied the Miranda
waiver standard first articulated in Johnson v. Zerbst,1I1I that
waiver must be made voluntarily, knowingly; and intelligently.1I6
The Moran court stated that the waiver inquiry "has two distinct dimensions. "117 First, the waiver must have been "voluntary
in the sense that it was the product of free and deliberate choice
rather than intimidation, coercion or deception. Second, the
waiver must have been made with a full awareness of both the
nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the
decision to abandon it."118 The "totality of the circumstances
surrounding the interrogation"119 must reveal "both an un coerced
choice and the requisite level of comprehension" for the waiver
to have been effective. 60
Nine months following Moran, the Court in Colorado v.
Connelly held that although the defendant was mentally ill, his
waiver was voluntary, thus valid. 61 The Connelly Court, seemingly in contradiction to the dual waiver requirements62 announced in Moran, held that a waiver cannot be involuntary
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
absent police coercion. 6s The majority reasoned that the sole
concern of the Fifth Amendment, on which Miranda was based,
is governmental coercion. 64 The Court stated that under a due
process analysis, beginning with Brown v. Mississippi,611 all cases
deciding the constitutionality of a confession have contained a
substantial element of police coercion. 66 The Connelly Court
54. Id. at 422 (In Moran, police did not tell the defendant that a lawyer had been
retained for him and was attempting to see him. Police tried to prevent the lawyer from
seeing the accused. The Court stated that the facts in Moran did not amount to a due
process violation. Yet the majority left open the possibility of a due process violation "on
facts more egregious than those presented here." Id. at 432).
55. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. at 464, 475 (1938).
56.Id.
57. Moran, 475 U.S. at 421 (1986) (citing Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 482

(1981); Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 404 (1977».
58. Id. at 421.
59. Id. (citing Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. at 725 (1979); North Carolina v. Butler,
441 U.S. at 374-75 (1979».
60. Id. (emphasis added).
61. Connelly, 479 U.S. at 157 (1986).
62. Moran, 475 U.S. at 421 (1986). See infra notes 56-59 and accompanying text.
63. E.g., Connelly, 479 U.S. at 167 (1986).
64. Id. at 170.
65. Brown, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
66. Connelly, 479 U.S. at 163, 164 (1986) ("Thus the cases considered by this court
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stated that it is not the role of the Court· to make "sweeping
inquiries into the state of mind of a criminal defendant who has
confessed" unless there is evidence of police coercion. 67 The majority reasoned that because a psychiatrist testified that Connelly's mental illness did not significantly impair his cognitive
abilities, he understood his rights when he waived them. 68 Thus,
without evidence of coercive police conduct, his waiver was
\·oluntary.69
In 1987, the United States Supreme Court, in Colorado v.
Spring,1° continued to state that Miranda waivers must be made
"voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently."71 The Court followed
the Moran approach in analyzing the effectiveness of the Miranda waiver in terms of both its coerciveness and whether it
was knowingly and intelligently made. 72 Citing Connelly,73 the
Court found that defendant's decision to waive his Miranda
rights did not result from coercive police conduct and therefore
was voluntary. The Court then concluded that defendant's
waiver was knowingly and intelligently made. 74 Citing Moran,75
the Court stated that "the Constitution does not require that a
criminal suspect know and understand every possible conseover the 50 years since Brou·n l·. Mississippi have focused upon the crucial element of
police overreaching." [d. at 163) (The Connelly Court cites evidence of coercion in postBrolm U.S. Supreme Court due process waiver cases. [d. at n.l. The Court concludes:
"While each confession case has turned on its own set of facts justifying the conclusion
that police conduct was oppressive. all have contained a substantial element of coercive
police conduct." [d. at 163-64).
67. [d. at 166-67.
68. [d. at 161.
69. [d. at 167.
70. Colorado v. Spring. 479 ES. 564 (1987).
71. [d. at 572.
72. [d. at 573-74 (In Spring. the defendant was implicated in a Colorado murder
based on information received from an informant regarding the defendant's involvement
in interstate transportation of stolen firearms. His arrest resulted from the undercover
purchase of stolen firearms from the defendant. After being arrested. defendant wai\'ed
his ,"Iiranda rights. While being questioned about the firearms transactions. police asked
defendant whether he had shot the murder victim. which he denied. Police again questioned defendant almost two months later. Defendant again waived his Miranda rights.
He then confessed to the Colorado murder. The United States Supreme Court held that
a suspect's awareness of all the crimes about which he could be questioned during interrogation did not invalidate his decision to waive the Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination. Therefore. failure to inform defendant before the second interrogation
that they would question him about the murder did not affect his waiver.).
73. [d. at 574.
7·1. [d. at 574-75.
75. Moran. 475 U.S. 412 (1986!.
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quence of a waiver of the Fifth Amendment privilege."76
~

This limitation is also stated in Connelly,77 and represents
the Court's legitimate reluctance to analyze the mental process
of every defendant who waives Miranda rights and later decides
to challenge the validity of the waiver in court. However, this
limitation does not preclude courts from evaluating juvenile
waivers in terms of whether they are knowing and intelligent.
Courts need not make "sweeping inquiries into the state of
mind"78 of juvenile offenders (or, for that matter, criminal defendants) to ensure that juveniles have sufficient cognitive skills
to knowingly and intelligently waive Miranda rights.
Recently, the United States Supreme Court again applied
the "dual waiver requirements" announced in Moran. The Court
in Patterson v. Illinois 79 determined the validity of defendant's
Miranda waiver of the right to counsel in terms of whether the
waiver was both voluntary, and knowing and intelligent. 8o The
court again recognized the dual requirements81 that a Miranda
waiver must be knowing and intelligent82 as well as voluntary.83
In summary, the United States Supreme Court decisions
following Connelly suggest that the knowing and intelligent requirement remains intact. 84 Arguably, the requirement depends
on Fifth Amendment grounds and is not, as stated by the Connelly court, solely dependent on States' rules of evidence. 81i The
decisions subsequent to Connelly deciding a waiver issue reach
76. Spring, 479 U.S. at 574 (1987).
77. Connelly, 479 U.S. at 166-67 (1986).
78.Id.
79. Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285 (1988).
80. Id. at 292 & n.4 (In Patterson, the Court held that Miranda warnings were sufficient to make the defendant aware of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel during
post-indictment questioning. The Court concluded that defendant's un counseled statements were admissible where he knowingly and intelligently chose to communicate with
police without assistance of counsel.).
81. See infra notes 56-59, 61 and accompanying text.
82. Id. at 292 ("The specific issue here is whether this waiver was a 'knowing and
intelligent' waiver of his Sixth Amendment right." Id. (citing Brewer v. Williams, 430
U.S. at 401, 404 (1977); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. at 464-65 (1938»).
83. Id. at n.4 ("Of course we also require that any such waiver must be voluntary.").
84. See Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 573 (1987); Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S.
285, 292 & n.4 (1988); Michigan v. Harvey, 110 S. Ct. 1176, 1179 (1990); Illinois v. Perkins, 110 S. Ct. 2394 (1990).
85. See infra note 11.
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their holdings with no mention of the applicable States' rules of
evidence. 86 Therefore, apparently in some circumstances, as
where a learning disabled juvenile lacks sufficient cognitive skills
to knowingly and intelligently waive Miranda rights, a Miranda
waiver can be invalid even though police coercion is absent.
III. WAIVER OF MIRANDA RIGHTS BY JUVENILES IN
CALIFORNIA
California courts have closely paralleled federal standards in
determining the validity of a juvenile's waiver of Fifth and Sixth
Amendment rights. In a pre-Miranda 'case, People v. Lara,87 the
California Supreme Court held that juveniles are competent to
waive constitutional rights88 and to make voluntary confessions. 89 Two California decisions, In re Anthony J.90 and In re
Jessie L.,91 parallel the factors set forth in Fare v. Michael C. 92
for courts to consider when determining the voluntariness of a
juvenile confession. These factors include age, intelligence, education, experience, and ability to comprehend the meaning and
effect of statements to police. 93 As in Fare, these factors are considered in the totality of the circumstances. 94
Following the United States Supreme Court In re Gault decision,95 California courts state that the prosecution has an even
86. See note 82.
87. People v. Lara, 67 Cal. 2d 365, 432 P.2d 202, 62 Cal. Rptr. 586 (1967).
88. Id. at 378-79, 432 P.2d at 211-12, 62 Cal. Rptr. at 595-96.
89. Id. at 383, 432 P.2d at 215, 62 Cal. Rptr. at 599.
90. In re Anthony J., 107 Cal. App. 3d 962, 166 Cal. Rptr. 238 (1980) (The court
held that a 15 year old defendant with borderline I.Q. is not precluded from intelligently
waiving Miranda rights.).
91. In re Jessie L., 131 Cal. App. 3d 202, 182 Cal. Rptr. 396 (1982) (In Jessie L., a 14
year old was held to have voluntarily waived his Miranda rights where a diagnostic study
showed he was in the 9th grade and had 5th to 7th grade skills, an 89 LQ., and average
LQ. potential. The defendant claimed not to have understood the Miranda instructions.). See also In re Willie T., 71 Cal. App. 3d 345, 139 Cal. Rptr. 439 (1977) (A juvenile with an 85 LQ. who is far behind in school is not incapable of intelligently waiving
Miranda rights.).
92. Fare, 442 U.S. 707 (1979).
93. Anthony J., 107 Cal. App. 3d 962, 166 Cal. Rptr. 238 (1980); Jessie L., 131 Cal.
App. 3d 202, 182 Cal. Rptr. 396 (1982).
94. Anthony J., 107 Cal. App. 3d at 971, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 244 (1980) ("The burden
is on the prosecution to establish that an accused's statements are voluntary."); See, e.g.,
People v. Eduardo N.G., 108 Cal. App. 3d 745, 166 Cal. Rptr. 873 (1980).
95. Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 55 (1967).
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greater burden to prove the voluntariness of a juvenile waiver
than with an adult waiver.98 California courts look closely at
whether the juvenile accused understood the Miranda rights
prior to waiving them. 97
The court in In re Brian W. 98 held the juvenile'S waiver was
valid because the police explained his rights in a language he
understood. 99 The juvenile changed his mind and waived his
rights after initially deciding not to do SO.100 In In re Frank
C./Ol the court again closely scrutinized the juvenile's waiver to
ensure it was voluntary. In Frank C., the waiver was held valid
where the juvenile's actions and words did not suggest a lack of
understanding of his rights or the effect of waiver of his rights. l02
In In re John S./03 the court held that because the juvenile
calmly told the police officer he understood his rights and
wanted to waive them, the waiver was voluntary. 10. The court
also held that there is no requirement that a juvenile must have
parental consent for a waiver to be valid. 1011
Analyzing the voluntariness of waivers by learning disabled
juveniles is conceptually similar to analyzing waivers by mentally ill adults. l08 The voluntary waiver issue is often presented
96. Anthony J., 107 Cal. App. 3d at 971, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 244 (The burden to
prove the accused's statements are voluntary is greater in the case of a juvenile than the
case of an adult.).
97. Id. See also infra notes 97-100 and accompanying text.
98. In re Brian W., 125 Cal. App. 3d 590, 178 Cal. Rptr. 159; cert. denied, 456 U.S.
980 (1981).
99.Id.
100. Id.
101. In re Frank C., 138 Cal. App. 3d 708, 188 Cal. Rptr. 68 (1982).
102. Id. at 712-14, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 70-72.
103. In re John S., 199 Cal. App. 3d 441, 245 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1988), cert. denied, 488

U.S. 928 (1988).
104. Id. at 444, 446, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 18-19. (The court also referred to the fact that
the defendant did not claim he was unable to make an intelligent and knowing waiver
due to any lack of maturity, intelligence, or education. Id. at 446, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 19).
105. Id. at 446, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 19.
106. A Miranda waiver by a mentally ill adult may be similar to a waiver by a learning disabled juvenile in that both waivers may be effectuated by an individual lacking
sufficient cognitive skills to voluntarily waive those rights. Such waivers are involuntary
if the individual is unable to understand their rights and the consequences of the decision to waive those rights. See, e.g., Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. at 403; Johnson v.
Zerbst, 304 U.S. at 464; Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. at 292; Adams v. McCann, 317 U.S.
at 279; Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. at 421. See also infra notes 44-47 and accompanying
paragraph.
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in the context of an adult defendant who, as in Connelly, has
some form of mental disorder. Sixteen years prior to Connelly,
the California Supreme Court in People v. MacPherson lo7 held
that a mental condition can render a confession invalid, even absent police coercion. lOS The MacPherson Court held that a statement given to police by an adult schizophrenic defendant was
involuntary and violated due process. 109 The Court stated that
"it is immaterial that the statements were not elicited by law
enforcement officials and that defendant's capacity to refrain
from making the statements was destroyed by mental disorders
beyond anyone's control."110 The adult's confession violated due
process due to the unreliability of the confession and lack of rational choice of the accused. I I I
The MacPherson due process analysis left the door open for
subsequent courts. to apply a similar analysis when deciding
whether a waiver by a learning disabled juvenile violated due
process. Under this analysis, California courts would be permitted to hold that a juvenile waiver violated due process if a learning disability precluded voluntary waiver. But the United States
Supreme Court holding in Connelly 1l2 forced California courts
to review waivers under the Connelly, as opposed to the MacPherson, analysis. As a result, in California (at least where the
facts parallel those in Connelly), as long as a mentally ill defendant possesses sufficient cognitive skills to waive Miranda
rights, the waiver and subsequent confession is valid, absent police coercion.
California voters voiced their preference toward limiting
107. People v. MacPherson, 2 Cal. 3d 109, 465 P.2d 17, 84 Cal. Rptr. 129 (1970).
108. [d. at 115, 465 P.2d at 21, 84 Cal. Rptr. at 133.
109. [d.
110. [d.
111. [d. The court stated:

Under these circumstances, it is immaterial that the statements were not elicited by law enforcement officials and that
defendant's capacity to refrain from making the statements
was destroyed by mental disorders beyond anyone's control. .. This judgement can without difficulty be articulated in
terms of the unreliability of the confession, the lack of rational
choice of the accused, or simply the strong conviction that our
system of law enforcement should not operate to take advantage of a p,erson in this fashion.
112. Connelly, 479 U.S. at 166-67 (1986).
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rights afforded criminal defendants under the California Constitution by voting in favor of Proposition 8 in 1982 and Proposition 115 in 1990. This preference among California voters to
limit rights afforded criminal defendants parallels the recent
trend of the United States Supreme Court toward limiting defendant rights. The Connelly decision is a clear example of the
federal trend.
Proposition 8,113 or the "Right to Truth-in-Evidence" provision, amended the California Constitution to state that, except
as provided by statute, relevant evidence may not be excluded in
any criminal or juvenile proceeding. 1l4 The provision states, m
pertinent part:
Except as provided by statute hereafter enacted
by a two-thirds vote of the membership in each
house of the Legislature, relevant evidence shall
not be excluded in any criminal proceeding, including pretrial and post conviction motions and
hearings, or in any trial or hearing of a juvenile
for a criminal offense, whether heard in juvenile
or adult court. Nothing in this section shall affect
any existing statutory rule of evidence relating to
privilege or hearsay, or Evidence Code, Sections
352, 782 or 1103. Nothing in this section shall affect any existing statutory or constitutional right
of the press. m

The Truth in Evidence provision has been interpreted by the
California Supreme Court in People u. Markham 1l6 as disposing
of judicially created exclusionary rules, except as required by the
Constitution of the United States. ll7 Therefore, under the Cali113. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28(d) [hereinafter Truth in Evidence Provision).
114. [d.
115. [d. (emphasis added).
116. People v. Markham, 49 Cal. 3d. 63, 69, 775 P.2d 1042, 1046, 260 Cal. Rptr. 273,
277 (1989).
117. [d. at 69, 775 P.2d at 1046, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 277. The Markham court stated:
Given the probable aim of the voters in adopting section
28(d), namely, to dispense with exclusionary rules derived
solely from the state Constitution, it is not reasonably likely
that the California voters intended to preserve, in the form of
a 'statutory' privilege, a judicially created exclusionary rule expressly rejected by the United States Supreme Court under
the federal Constitution.
See also In re Lance W., 37 Cal. 3d. 873, 887, 694 P.2d 744. 752. 210 Cal. Rptr. 631. 639-
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fornia Constitution, waiver admissibility standards regarding the
exclusion of evidence are prescribed by the federal
Constitution. 118
This trend among California voters toward limiting rights
afforded criminal defendants to those required by the federal
Constitution continued in June, 1990, when a majority of
Californians voted in favor of Proposition 115,119 known as the
"Crime Victims Justice Reform Act." Section 3 of Proposition
115, which has been struck down by the California Supreme
Court in Rauen u. Deukmejian,120 would have limited the rights
of criminal adult and juvenile defendants to those afforded by
the United States Constitution. 121 The provision held unenforceable by the Rauen court, Section 3, would have amended Section
24, Article I of the California Constitution to read, in pertinent
part:
In criminal cases the rights of a defendant to
equal protection of the laws, to due process of
law, to the assistance of counsel, to be pe~sonally
present with counsel, to speedy and public trial,
to compel the attendance of witnesses, to confront
the witnesses against him or her, to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures, to privacy, to
not be compelled to be a witness against himself
or herself, not to be placed twice in jeopardy for
the same offense, and not to suffer the imposition
of cruel or unusual punishment, shall be construed by the courts of this state in a manner consistent with the Constitution of the United
States. This Constitution shall not be construed
by the courts to afford greater rights to criminal
defendants than those afforded by the Constitu40 (1985) (The Lance W. court stated: "The people have apparently decided that the
exclusion of evidence is not an acceptable means of implementing those rights except as
required by the Constitution of the United States.").
118. See infra note 114.
119. 1990 Cal. Adv. Legis. Servo 115 (West).
120. Raven V. Deukmejian, 52 Cal. 3d 336 (1990) (The Raven court stated that the
effect of the measure would amount to a revision of the California Constitution, which is
beyond the result of the initiative process. The court reasoned that Section 3 of Proposition 115 unduly restricts judicial power in a way which severely limits the independent
force and effect of the California Constitution. Therefore, the court held that Section 3
of Proposition 115 may not be enforced.).
121. 1990 Cal. Adv. Legis. Servo 115 (West).
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tion of the United States, nor shall it be construed to afford greater rights to minors in juvenile proceedings on criminal causes than those
afforded by the Constitution of the United
States. "IU

Accordingly, if voters had been successful in implementing Section 3 of Proposition 115, federal constitutional standards regarding waiver of Miranda rights would have controlled case law
in California. Specifically, California courts would have been required to apply the federal Connelly holding that mental illness
does not in itself render a waiver involuntary.u3 The Connelly
holding is contrary to the California MacPherson holding that a
confession by a mentally ill person is involuntary and violates
due process. l24
Section 3 of Proposition 115, if implemented, would have
presented another hurdle in addition to Proposition 8 for courts
to .overcome in order to hold invalid waivers by mentally ill
adults or learning disabled juveniles. Yet the Raven 12& court
overturned Section 3 of the provision restricting state criminal
rights to rights under federal law. 126 As a result, Section 3 of
Proposition 115 does not prevent California courts from following state constitutional principles relied on in MacPherson 127 in
order to invalidate a waiver and subsequent confession by a
mentally ill person because it violates due process. 128
The MacPherson due process analysis arguably applies to
waivers by learning disabled juveniles. 129 Yet Proposition 8 prevents implementing the MacPherson due process analysis
through the exclusionary rule, unless the court concludes the
statement is so inherently unreliable that it may be excluded as
nonprobative under California Evidence Code section 352.130 AI122. [d. (emphasis added).
123. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986) (Absent police coercion, waiver cannot be invol·

untary under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United
States Constitution.).
124. MacPherson, 2 Cal. 3d 109, 465 P.2d 17, 84 Cal. Rptr. 129 (1970).
125. Raven v. Deukmejian, 52 Cal. 3d 336 (1990).
126. [d.
127. MacPherson, 2 Cal. 3d 109,465 P.2d 17,84 Cal. Rptr. 129 (1970).
128. [d.
129. See infra notes 103. 108 and accompanying text.
130. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28(d); See also infra notes 109-11 and accompanying text.
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though Section 3 of Proposition 115 was invalidated, the court
did not invalidate the remaining provisions of the proposition.
The sections of Proposition 115 unaffected by the Raven decision are additional examples of the continuing preference among
California voters to follow federal law in defining criminal rights
under the state constitution.
IV. LEARNING DISABILITIES, COGNITION, AND JUVENILE CRIME - AN OVERVIEW

A.

LEARNING DISABILITIES AND COGNITION: DEFINED

It is estimated that 10,000,000 American children have been
diagnosed as suffering from learning disabilities. 131 A learning
disability is an inability to effectively process oral, written, or
visual information. 132 Individuals who are learning disabled are
usually average or above average in intelligence, but lack skills
necessary for processing sensory information. 133 The former U.S.
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare defined specific
learning disabilities as disorders in the understanding, or
processing of language, including difficulties in listening, thinking, communicating, reading; or math. I3•
131. 131 CONGo REC. S10,800-01 (1985).
132. Morgan, Learning Disabilities and Crime: Struggle to Snap the Link, N.Y.
Times, Oct. 31, 1988, § B, at I, col. 2.
133. [d. See also Higbee, Dwinell & Kalivoda, Serving Learning Disabled Students
Within & Outside the Classroom (paper presented at the Annual Conference of the
American College Personnel Association, Washington, D.C. (March 1989» (available
from Educational Resources Informational Center) (citing definition by the Association
of Children and Adults with Learning Disabilities [hereinafter ACLD). The ACLD is a
nonprofit organization of parents and professionals with state and local affiliates
throughout the United States.).
134. [d. (referring to Federal Register definition, defining specific learning disability
as:
a disorder in one or more of the basic psychological processes
involved in understanding and using language, spoken or written, which may manifest itself in an imperfect ability to listen,
think, speak, read, write, spell, or to do mathematical calculations. The term includes such conditions as perceptual handicaps, brain injury, minimal brain dysfunction, dyslexia, and
developmental aphasia. The term does not include children
who have learning problems which are primarily the result of
visual, learning or motor handicaps, or mental retardation, or
of environmental, cultural or economic disadvantage.).
See also B. OSMAN. LEARNING DISABILITIES - A FAMILY AFFAIR 5, 169 (1985).
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A learning disability is defined as "a response pattern in
learning situations which is inefficient and which interferes with
the student's ability to understand, remember, apply or integrate the material being taught. "1311 A specific learning disability
is "a chronic condition of neurological origin which selectively
interferes with the development, integration, and/or demonstration of verbal and/or non-verbal abilities."ls6 The term "specific
learning disability" does not include children who have learning
problems that result from visual or motor handicaps, or mental
retardation. 137
Learning disabilities are often the manifestation of cognitive
problems. Cognition is the act or process of knowing and includes both awareness and judgment. 13B Cognitive problems
stem from difficulty organizing or sequencing thoughts or distinguishing between concepts. 13D
B. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LANGUAGE DISORDERS AND LEARNING
DISABILITIES

For a waiver to be voluntary under a due process analysis, a
juvenile must have the cognitive ability both to understand the
Miranda rights and communicate a valid waiver.14o A juvenile is
L. GREENE. KIDS WHO HATE SCHOOL - A SURVIVAL HANDBOOK ON LEARNING DIS41 (1983).
136. Higbee, Dwinell, & Kalivoda, Serving Learning Disabled Students Within &
Outside the Classroom (paper presented at the Annual Conference of the American College Personnel Association, Washington, D.C. (March 1989)) (citing ACLD definition).
The full text of the ACLD definition of a Specific Learning Disability is:
a chronic condition of neurological origin which selectively interferes with the development, integration, and/or demonstration of verbal and/or non-verbal abilities. Specific Learning
Disabilities exist as a distinct handicapping condition in the
presence of average to superior intelligence, adequate sensory
and motor systems, and adequate learning opportunities. The
condition varies in its manifestations. and in degree of severity.
Throughout life the condition can affect self-esteem, education, vocation, socialization, and/or daily living activities.
137. Id.
138. WEBSTER'S SEVENTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 161 (1969).
139. Higbee, Dwinell, & Kalivoda, Serving Learning Disabled Students Within &
Outside the Classroom (paper presented at the Annual Conference of the American College Personnel Association, Washington, D.C. (March 1989)).
140. In Fare v. Michael C., the Court stated that a juvenile'S capacity to understand
the nature of the warnings given him, the nature of his Fifth Amendment rights, and the
consequences of waiving those rights, are factors in determining whether a juvenile has

135.

ABILITIES
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per se unable to effectuate a valid waiver if, due to a learning
disability, there is a lack of sufficient cognitive abilities to understand Miranda rights and communicate a valid waiver.14l
Language disorders are the type of learning disability most
likely to prevent a valid juvenile waiver.

Two components of a language disorder are deficient decoding142 and encoding143 skills. A juvenile with a language disorder
that includes deficient decoding skills may be unable to understand the Miranda instructions. A juvenile who has deficient encoding skills may be unable to communicate a voluntary Miranda waiver. Accordingly, it is crucial to determine if a learning
disabled juvenile has deficient decoding and encoding skills
when arguing that a waiver or subsequent confession by a learning disabled juvenile violates due process.
Statistical evidence supports the position that because most
learning disabled juveniles have language deficits, they are incapable of either understanding Miranda rights or effectually
waiving those rights. A recent study found that of 242 children
with learning disabilities, 90.5% of the children had language
deficits. IH One or more communication disorders were detected
in 96.2% of the children tested. m The study concluded that "for
the population studied, a learning disability was practically synonymous with a diagnosis of a communication disorder."I46
This high rate of communication deficits among children with
learning disabilities has been noted previously.I47 Earlier studies
knowingly and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights. Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707
(1979). It is unclear whether the Connelly holding governing adult waivers abrogates the
juvenile waiver standards set forth in Fare.
141. See infra notes 9, 16-19 and accompanying text.
142. Decoding is the process of responding to the auditory or visual information. To
decode means to perceptually process sensory information, such as spoken language or
visual images. L. GREENE, KIDS WHO HATE SCHOOL A SURVIVAL HANDBOOK ON LEARNING
DISABILITIES 50 (1983).
143. Encoding is the process of writing or speaking by retrieving the written or spoken information from memory and using those symbols to express oneself. [d. at 218.
144. Gibbs & Cooper, Prevalence of Communication Disorders in Students with
Learning Disabilities, 22 JOURNAL OF LEARNING DISABILITIES 60 (1989) (study was conducted in a school district in Alabama of 242 learning disabled students between ages 8
and 12.).
145. Id. at 61.
146. Id. at 62.
147. [d. at 60 (referring to FEAGANS, CURRENT TOPICS IN LEARNING DISABILITIES 87118 (1983); Freeman & Perkins, The Prevalence of Middle Ear Disease Among Learning
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have also confirmed the prevalence of language deficits among
learning disabled adults and juveniles with communication disorders (although in smaller percentages).148
Research conducted in 1986 149 supports the position impliedly taken by the Connelly court: that a juvenile who has sufficient cognitive abilities is capable of understanding Miranda
rights and voluntarily waiving them. The research found that of
the learning disabled and language-impaired (LD/LI) children
tested, the children communicated as effectively as their corresponding age-mates.l~O At least initially, this conclusion seems to
contradict the hypothesis that LD/LI children are deficient encoders of new information.lIIl Yet the authors were not surprised
by the result because the LD/LI children and age-mates tested
possessed similar cognitive levels and years of worldly experience.l~2 Thus, because this research did not compare LD/LI students with dissimilar cognitive abilities, the results do not undermine the position stated (and supported by research) above deficient encoding skills may preclude a valid juvenile waiver.
The premise that learning disabled juveniles may not possess
sufficient cognitive abilities to voluntarily waive Miranda rights
also remains viable.
The threshold inquiry regarding a learning disabled juvenile's ability to communicate a valid waiver should begin with an
assessment of cognitive abilities. By establishing that a juvenile
lacks sufficient cognitive abilities, the proponent can assert all
three arguments proposed in this article: m
Impaired Children, 18 CLINICAL PEDIATRICS 205·10 (1979); JOHNSON & MORASKY, LEARN·
ING DISABILITIES (2d ed. 1980); KEOH & MAJOR· KINGSLEY, A SYSTEM OF MARKER VARI·
ABLES FOR THE FIELD OF LEARNING DISABILITIES (1982); MERCER, STUDENTS WITH LEARNING
DISABILITIES (2d ed. 1983); SCHOLL, DEVELOPMENTAL THEORY AND RESEARCH IN LEARNING
DISABILITIES (1981); WIIG & SEMEL, INTERVENTION FOR THE LEARNING DISABLED (1980)).
148. Gibbs & Cooper, Prevalence of Communication Disorders in Students with
Learning Disabilities, 22 JOURNAL OF LEARNING DISABILITIES 60 (1989) (referring to
MARGE, PRINCIPALS OF CHILDHOOD LANGUAGE DISABILITIES 75·98 (1972); Newcomer &
Magee, The Performance of Learning (Reading) Disabled Children on a Test of Spoken
Language, THE READING TEACHER 899·900 (1977)).
149. Meline, Referential Communication Skills of Learning Disabled/Language 1m·
paired Children, 7:2 ApPLIED PSYCHOLINGUISTICS 129·40 (1986).
150. I d. at 136.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. However, it should be kept in mind that a waiver by a learning disabled juve·
nile who does not have deficient cognitive abilities can still be challenged by asserting
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1) The Connelly coercion standard does not control where a
learning disabled juvenile lacks sufficient cognitive ability to voluntarily waive' Miranda rights.
2) Learning disabled juveniles are especially unlikely to
possess sufficient cognitive skills to knowingly and intelligently
waive Miranda rights.
3) The Connelly waiver standard applies to adults and does
not control juvenile proceedings.
After establishing the juvenile's cognitive abilities, the proponent should then determine whether specific language deficits
exist in areas such as decoding and encoding skills. By following
this 2-step process, the proponent establishes both the cognitive
deficiency (the effect resulting from the underlying learning disability) and its underlying cause (the specific learning
disability).
C.

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LEARNING DISABILITIES AND JUVENILE

CRIME

A 1980 journal article refers to previous studies citing statistical information linking juvenile crime with learning disabilities. Hi4 One statistic cited is that up to 90 per cent of institutionalized or adjudicated juvenile delinquents in 1977 had some
form of a learning disability. Hili Most studies show six times
more learning disabled delinquent boys than girls. lli6
In the late 1970s, two studies investigated the relationship
between learning disabilities and juvenile delinquency.lli7 One
study was conducted by the Association for Children with
Learning Disabilities (ACLD) and the other by the National
argument #3 above: The Connelly holding does not control juvenile proceedings.
154. McKay & Brumback, Relationship Between Learning Disabilities and Juvenile Delinquency, 51 PERCEPTUAL & MOTOR SKILLS 1223-26 (1980).
155. Id. at 1224 (referring to Murray, The Link Between Learning Disabilities and
Juvenile Delinquency: Current Theory and Knowledge, No. 244-819 U. S. GOV'T PRINTING OFFICE (1977)).
156. Id. (referring to Mauser, Learning Disabilities and Delinquent Youth, 9 ACADEMIC THERAPY QUARTERLY 389-402 (1974».
157. Crawford, The Link Between Delinquency and Learning Disabilities, 24 THE
JUDGES' JOURNAL 23 (1985).
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Center for State Courts. The research revealed the following statistical evidence linking learning disabilities and juvenile
delinquency: 1118
1) The chances of being adjudicated were 200 percent
greater for juveniles with learning disabilities than for their nonlearning disabled peers.
2) The odds of being taken into custody by police were also

200 percent greater for learning disabled juveniles than for nonlearning disabled juveniles.
3) 36

percent of adjudicated juveniles were learning

disabled.
4) For comparable offenses, learning disabled juveniles had
higher probabilities of arrest and adjudication than those without learning disabilities.
The above statistical correlation between learning disabilities and juvenile crime is also referred to in a recent article by
Judge Thom'as P. McGee. 11l9 Judge McGee cites additional studies of youths adjudicated by juvenile courts. Of the 40 to 70 percent of juveniles studied who show significant neurodevelopmental abnormalities, language and cognitive abnormalities were
common. 160 Judge McGee refers to one hypothesis in the "Link
Study"161 that might account for the high proportion of learning
disabilities in the adjudicated juvenile population: differential
adjudication caused by poor cognitive and communications
skills. 162 Judge McGee states that the learning disabled child
may be unable to express himself in court as clearly as the nonlearning disabled child. 163 Specific impairments resulting from a
158. [d.

159. Hon. T. McGee, Learning Disabilities and the Juvenile Justice System, LID
LAW 5-7 (Spring, 1979) (Appellate Division, First Department, Supreme Court of New
York; Committee on Juvenile Justice, Dyslexia, and Other Learning Disabilities) (Judge
McGee is Chief Judge at Jefferson Parish Juvenile Court in Gretna, Louisiana. He is
chairman of the National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges Committee on
Learning Disabilities and Juvenile Delinquency. Judge McGee is a frequent speaker on
the issue of learning disabilities and juvenile justice.).
160.
161.
162.
163.

[d.
[d. (referring to the ACLD study as the "Link Study.").
[d.
[d.
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learning disability may make a juvenile "more susceptible to getting into trouble with the law. . and less able to extricate himself from the process. "164
The same argument set forth by Judge McGee to explain
the link between learning disabilities and adjudications can be
applied where learning disabled juveniles are arrested - that arrested learning disabled juveniles are less able to express themselves and are "less able to extricate [themselves] from the process. "1611 A recent journal article discusses hypothetical
explanations for the connection between learning disabilities
and delinquency.166 The "differential arrest hypothesis" maintains that learning disabled juveniles have a greater risk of being
picked up by the police than do non-learning disabled
juveniles. 167 The "differential adjudication hypothesis" posits
that once a learning disabled juvenile is charged with an offense,
the juvenile is at greater risk of adjudication than with nonlearning disabled juveniles. 16s
Congress has recognized the link between learning disabilities and juvenile crime and cites Judge McGee's conclusions regarding the reasons for this connection. 169 The Senate, in its
findings, refers to the statistical correlation between learning
disabilities and criminal behavior: Although only 15 percent of
the United States population is learning disabled, 36 percent of
juvenile delinquency cases involve individuals with learning disabilities. 170 Within the typical jail population, at least 40 percent
of the inmates are learning disabled.17l In addition, the Senate
acknowledges a Fordham University study that found that
164. Id. at 6.
165. Id.
166. Eller, The Learning Disabled Delinquent, 11 THE LEARNING CONSULTANT JOURNAL 34-36 (1990).
167. Id. at 35.
168. Id.
169. 135 CONGo REC. 8601-01 (1989); 131 CONGo REC. 810,800-01 (1985); Proposed
Amendment to the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974 to Authorize Appropriations for Fiscal Years 1985 - 1989: Hearings on H.R. 4971 Before the
Committee on Education and Labor of the House of Representatives, 98th Cong., 2d
8ess. 513 (1984) ("There is definitely evidence that LD youth engage in significantly
more delinquent behavior than non-LD youth."). See infra notes 156-63 and accompanying text.
170. 135 CONGo REC. 8601-01 (1989).
171. Id.
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learning disabled individuals are 220 percent more likely to be
adjudicated than those who are not learning disabled. 1'72
Congress has authorized the development and implementation of programs relating to juvenile delinquency and learning
disabilities.1'73 Specifically, Congress has funded training programs to assist juvenile justice personnel in recognizing learning
disabled juveniles.1'74 Yet the connection between learning disabilities and juvenile crime remains largely unaddressed by the
juvenile court system.17II
The analysis below is intended to help harmonize the Connelly decision with juvenile waivers that are neither knowing or
intelligent. Research cited below demonstrates that learning disabled juveniles are especially unlikely to effect a knowing and
intelligent waiver. At least one state supreme court has harmonized the Connelly voluntariness analysis with the knowing and
intelligent requirement, holding that the knowing and intelligent
requirement is separate from the voluntariness standard prescribed in Connelly.U6 That court found the juvenile waiver invalid because it was not knowing and intelligent. 177
V. ANALYSIS
A. THE Connelly COERCION STANDARD DOES NOT CONTROL
WHERE A JUVENILE LACKS SUFFICIENT COGNITIVE ABILITY TO VOLUNTARILY WAIVE

Miranda

RIGHTS

In Connelly, the Court decided the validity of a Miranda
waiver by an adult defendant. The Court determined that the
defendant possessed sufficient cognitive abilities to understand
his rights when he waived them. 178 In contrast, a learning disabled juvenile may lack sufficient cognitive abilities to understand the Miranda rights and the consequences of waiving them.
172. 133 CONGo REC. S7,666-02 (1987).
173. 42 U.S.C.A. § 5665(b)(5) (West 1990).
174. [d.; H.R. 1801, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 134 CONGo REC. S16,156-01 (1988).
175. 135 CONGo REC. S601-01 (1989). But see People V. Bernasco, 138 Ill. 2d 349, 562
N.E.2d 958 (1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2052 (1991).
176. [d. See infra notes 252-54, 258-60 and accompanying text.
177. Bernasco, 138 Ill. 2d 349, 562 N.E.2d 958 (1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2052
(1991).
178. Connelly, 479 U.S. at 161-62 (1986).

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol21/iss3/2

24

Greenburg: Juvenile Miranda Waiver

1991]

JUVENILE MIRANDA WAIVER

511

If the juvenile lacks sufficient cognitive skills, the waiver and
subsequent confession is not voluntary. Therefore, the coercion
waiver standard set forth in Connelly should not control.

The Connelly majority begins its analysis by referring to the
preliminary hearing testimony of Dr. Metzner, the psychiatrist
who ~xamined Connelly. Dr. Metzner testified that Connelly was
a chronic schizophrenic and was experiencing "command hallucinations."179 The Court stated: "Dr. Metzner further testified
that Connelly's illness did not significantly impair his cognitive
abilities. Thus, respondent understood the rights he had when
Officer Anderson and Detective Antuna advised him that he
need not speak."ISO Therefore, reasoned the Court, Connelly understood the Miranda rights when he confessed.l81
It is difficult to understand why the majority would cite evidence that Connelly had sufficient cognitive abilities to understand his rights and the consequences of waiving them unless it
considered Connelly's cognitive abilities relevant to the analysis. ls2 Neither Justice Brennan in his dissent nor the majority
opinion considered the factual situation where a defendant did
not in fact possess the cognitive abilities to enable a defendant
to voluntarily waive their rights.

The Connelly majority distinguishes between the ability to
understand Miranda rights and waiver of those rights, and what
motivates a person to confess. ls3 , This distinction is manifested
by the Court's understandable reluctance to retrospectively evaluate a defendant's motivation in waiving Miranda rights or to
subsequently confess. The Court was wary of expanding the
"voluntariness" standard by requiring courts to "divine a defendant's motivation for speaking or acting as he did,"184 or
making "sweeping inquiries into the state of mind of a criminal
defendant who has confessed"18C1 unless the police employed coercion. However, the majority's reluctance to expand the volun179. [d. at 161 (referring to transcripts from preliminary hearing at 56).
180. [d. at 161·62 (emphasis added) (referring to transcripts from preliminary hearing at 56-57).
181. [d. at 161-62.
182. [d.
183. Connelly, 479 U.S. at 166-67 (1986).
184. [d.
185. [d.
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tariness standard does not address a factual scenario where a
juvenile, unlike the Connelly defendant, lacks the ability to understand the Miranda rights or the consequences of waiving
those rights. Inquiring into a juvenile's cognitive abilities in order to determine whether the juvenile has the ability to understand their rights and the consequences of waiving them would
not require a court to make the type of sweeping inquiries into
what motivated the juvenile to confess that the Court was reluctant to make.
In his dissent in Connelly,188 Justice Brennan refers to the
holding in Moran u. Burbine,187 stating that "the waiver must
have been made with a full awareness both of the nature of the
right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to
abandon it."188 Justice Brennan argues that under the "totality
of the circumstances" approach, a waiver is valid only if the
choice to waive Miranda rights is uncoerced and there is a requisite level of comprehension. 189 Justice Brennan's analysis adheres to the Moran dual requirements of both: 1) a knowing and
intelligent, and 2) a voluntary waiver.
Although the majority and Justice Brennan differ on the
correct approach to determine whether a waiver is valid, both
sides could agree that a waiver is invalid where a juvenile is per
se unable to understand Miranda instructions due to a learning
disability. In such a case, neither the position taken by the majority nor by Justice Brennan would be mutually exclusive.

B. Connelly

DOES NOT ABROGATE THE REQUIREMENT THAT A

WAIVER MUST BE KNOWING AND INTELLIGENT IN ADDITION TO BEING UN COERCED

Beginning with the Miranda decision, the United States Supreme Court has stated that waivers of Fifth Amendment rights
must be made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. leo The
Fare Court stated that Miranda waivers are reviewed in the to186. [d. at 174-88.
187. Moran, 475 U.S. at 421 (1986) (decided the same year as Connelly).
188. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 188 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Moran, 475

U.S. at 421 (1986».
189. Connelly, 479 U.S. at 188 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
190. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444 (1967).
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tality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation. 191 The
Moran Court stated that there are dual requirements for Miranda waivers: First, the waiver must be voluntary, in the sense
that it is not the product of coercion. 192 Second, the waiver must
be knowing and intelligent, made with full awareness of both the
nature of the right abandoned and a requisite level of comprehension. 193 Yet the Connelly holding seems to contradict the
dual waiver requirements stated in Moran, holding that a waiver
cannot be involuntary under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment absent police coercion. 19•
Although research shows that even non-learning disabled
juveniles are unlikely to knowingly and intelligently waive Miranda rights,1911 California courts follow the Connelly approach
in analyzing adult waivers only in terms of their voluntariness. 196
California cases concerning juveniles have not commented specifically on the Connelly approach at the appellate or supreme
court level. 197 One state supreme court subsequent to Connelly,
the Supreme Court of Illinois, has held a waiver invalid where
the juvenile's waiver was voluntary under the Connelly analysis,
but not knowing and intelligent under Moran. 19S
Research on the effectiveness of juvenile waiver indicates
that most juveniles lack the capacity to voluntarily and intelli191. Fare, 442 U.S. at 725 (1979).
192. Moran, 475 U.S. at 421 (1986).
193. Id.
194. Connelly, 479 U.S. at 167 (1986).
195. See infra note 18.
196. E.g., People v. Green, 189 Cal. App. 3d 685, 234 Cal. Rptr. 497 (1987); People v.
Sultana, 204 Cal. App. 3d 511, 251 Cal. Rptr. 115 (1988); People v. Markham, 49 Cal. 3d
63, 775 P.2d 1042, 260 Cal. Rptr. 273 (1989); People v. Clark, 50 Cal. 3d 583, 789 P.2d
127, 268 Cal. Rptr. 399 (1990); People v. Cox, 221 Cal. App. 3d 980, 270 Cal. Rptr. 730
(1990); People v. Kelly, 51 Cal. 3d 931, 800 P.2d 516, 275 Cal. Rptr. 160 (1990).
197. At time of publication, the only post-Connelly appellate or Supreme Court decision hearing an appeal from a juvenile trial court on a Miranda waiver issue is In re
John S., 199 Cal. App. 3d 441, 245 Cal. Rptr. 17, cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 316 (1988). The
John S. court held that failure of the authorities to seek the consent of an adult in
addition to the juvenile's waiver did not invalidate the subsequent confession. Id. at 445,
245 Cal. Rptr. at 19. The court noted there was no claim that, based on his level of
maturity, intelligence, or education, the juvenile was unable to make an intelligent and
knowing waiver. Id. at 446. The John S. court concluded that his confession was "freely
and voluntarily made after a knowing and intelligent waiver." Id. at 447, 245 Cal. Rptr.
at 20. The court never reached the Connelly voluntariness issue.
198. People v. Bernasco, 138 Ill. 2d 349, 562 N.E.2d 958 (1990), cert. denied, 111 S.
Ct. 2052 (1991).
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gently waive Miranda rights. 199 In 1970, a study was conducted 200 wherein juveniles were interviewed using both the
standard formal Miranda warnings and modified, simplified
warnings. 201 The interviews were analyzed to compare the
juveniles' understanding of the formal warning compared with
the simplified warnings. The researchers concluded that 94 percent of the juveniles who received either the formal or simplified
warnings did not intelligently relinquish a known right.202
An analysis of two empirical studies on juveniles' capacity
to waive Miranda rights was the subject of a 1980 law review
article. 203 The author concluded that waiver of Miranda rights
by younger juveniles is not made intelligently, knowingly, and
voluntarily because the juveniles tested do not understand the
nature and significance of their rights.204 Juveniles below the age
of fifteen answered research questions with the apparent belief
they were compelled to confess without an attorney present.20~
The researchers concluded that the vast majority of these
juveniles are far less likely than adults to comprehend the na199. See infra notes 17-18.
200. Ferguson & Douglas, A Study of Juvenile Waiver, 7 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 39
(1970). In this study, 90 juveniles were interviewed using formal Miranda warnings and
simplified warnings. The simplified warnings were:
You don't have to talk with me at all, now, or later on, it is up
to you.
If you decide to talk to me, I can go to court and repeat what
you say, against you.
If you want a lawyer, an attorney, to help you decide what to
do, you can have one free before and during questioning by me
now or by anyone else later on.
Do you want me to explain or repeat anything about what I
have just told you?
Remembering what I've just told you, do you want to talk to
me?
Id. at 40.
201. Id.
202: Id. at 53. But see Now My Son, You Are a Man: The Judicial Response to
Uncounseled Waivers of Miranda Rights by Juveniles in Pennsylvania, 92 DICK. L. REV.
153, 175 n.138 (1987). 203. Grisso, Juveniles' Capacity to Waive Miranda Rights: An Empirical Analysis,
68 CALIF. L. REV. 1134 (1980) [hereinafter Juveniles' Capacity to Waive Miranda
Rights].
204. Id. at 1166.
205. Grisso & Promicter, Interrogation of Juveniles: An Empirical Study of Procedures, Safeguards. and Rights Waiver, 1 LAW & HUMAN BEHAV. 321 (1977). See also The
Judicial Response to Uncounseled Waivers of Miranda Rights by Juveniles in Pennsylvania, 92 DICK. L. REV. at 176 (1987).
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ture and significance of the Miranda rights. 206
The research in Juveniles' Capacity to Waive Miranda
Rights 207 shows that non-learning disabled juveniles are unlikely
to effectively waive Miranda rights. Learning disabled juveniles
typically have communication disorders that are likely to affect
a juvenile's cognitive abilities. 208 After considering this research,
it appears that a learning disabled juvenile would be even more
unlikely to knowingly and intelligently waive Miranda rights.
As stated above, California courts have followed the Connelly approach when analyzing adult waivers by ending the
waiver analysis if there is no evidence of coercion. 209 The courts
above the trial court level which discuss Miranda waivers in
terms of the Connelly holding involve adult, rather than juvenile
defendants. 21o One appellate court decision, In re John 8.,211 involves a juvenile. Yet because there was no claim the juvenile
was unable to make an intelligent and knowing waiver, the John
8. court reached its holding without discussing Connelly.212 Nevertheless, the adult waiver cases discussed below are instructive
as the kind of analysis post-Connelly juvenile courts may utilize
when reviewing waivers by learning disabled juveniles.
In 1987, two months after Connelly, the court in People v.
Green 213 held that defendant's waiver was uncoerced and therefore voluntary.214 The court referred to Connelly in stating "Miranda protects defendants against governmental coercion leading them to surrender rights protected by the Fifth Amendment;
it goes no further than that."2111 The court continued: "We sim206. Juveniles' Capacity to Waive Miranda Rights, 68 CALIF. L. REV. at 1160.
207. See infra note 202.
208. See infra notes 17-19 and accompanying text.
209. See infra note 195.
210. Id.
211. In re John S., 199 Cal. App. 3d 441, 245 Cal. Rptr. 17, cert. denied, 109 S. Ct.
316 (1988).
212. Id. at 446, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 19-20.
213. People v. Green, 189 Cal. App. 3d 685, 234 Cal. Rptr. 497 (1987).
214. Id. at 691, 234 Cal. Rptr. at 499, 500. (In Green, defendant appealed his manslaughter conviction claiming his waiver was invalid because he honestly, Yet mistakenly
believed that he could go home after being interrogated. The court stated that defendant's mistaken belief he would be allowed to go home after the interrogation "does not
render his waiver of his right to counsel invalid in the absence of any evidence demonstrating that he was induced by the police to harbor this belief.").
215. [d. at 693, 234 Cal. Rptr. at 500 (citing Connelly, 107 S. Ct. at 524 (1986)).
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ply cannot conclude that there is evidence of governmental coercion in this case."216 Although claiming to follow Connelly, the
court stated California waiver standards in terms that included
the knowing and intelligent requirement as well as being
voluntary.217
In upholding a manslaughter conviction, the California Supreme Court in People v. Sultana 218 also cited the Connelly coercion prerequisite for a waiver or confession to violate the Fifth
Amendment.219 The Court stated that under Connelly, "a confession cannot be 'involuntary' within the meaning of the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment unless there is coercive police activity."22o The court, in following Connelly, noted
that under the California Constitution coerCive police activity is
not a prerequisite for a confession to be involuntary.221
In 1989, the California Supreme Court in People v. Markham 222 held that under Proposition 8,223 the state must follow
the federal constitution in proving the voluntariness of defendant's confession only by a preponderance of the evidence, and
not beyond a reasonable doubt. 224 Although the Markham court
affirmed the lower court's determination that defendant's waiver
was knowing and intelligent,2211 the court only analyzes the
216. [d. at 693, 234 Cal. Rptr. at 500.
217. [d. at 691, 234 Cal. Rptr. at 499. (The Green Court stated: "In California,

before a confession can be used against a defendant, the prosecution has the burden of
proving that it was voluntary and not the result of any form of compulsion or promise or
reward ... The totality of the circumstances must be examined to determine whether the
confession was the product of a rational intellect and free will." [d. (emphasis added)).
218. People v. Sultana, 204 Cal. App. 3d 511, 251 Cal. Rptr. 115 (1988) cert. denied,
109 S. Ct. 1323 (1989).
219. [d. (" 'The sole concern of the Fifth Amendment, on which Miranda was based,
is governmental coercion,''' citing Connelly, 107 S. Ct. at 523 (1986)).
220. [d. at 522, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 120.
221. [d. at n.5. See, e.g., People v. MacPherson, 2 Cal. 3d 109, 465 P.2d 17, 84 Cal.
Rptr. 129 (1970). See also infra notes 106-09 and accompanying text.
222. People v. Markham, 49 Cal. 3d 63, 775 P.2d 1042, 260 Cal. Rptr. 273 (1989).
223. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28(d) [hereinafter Truth in Evidence provision). See infra
notes 111-16 and accompanying text.
224. Markham, 49 Cal. 3d at 65 n.2, 775 P.2d at 1043 n.2, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 274 n.2
(1989) (The Markham court stated that the federal preponderance of the evidence standard "applies both to a determination of voluntariness in the "traditional sense" (i.e.,
whether a confession was "coerced" by improper acts or overreaching on the part of the
police) - and to a determination of whether a defendant's waiver of Miranda rights was
voluntary." (citing Connelly, 479 U.S. at 168-69 (1986))).'
225. [d. at 66, 70, 775 P.2d at 1044, 1047, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 275, 279.
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waiver in terms of its voluntariness.226 The court upheld the determination by the trial court and magistrate that the defendant's waiver had been knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.227
Markham focuses on the relationship between state and
federal standards of review for voluntariness. The Court's discussion of voluntariness reflects the confusion surrounding the
term "voluntary" as used in Connelly.228 The decision also reflects the trend toward applying federal constitutional standards
governing rights afforded criminal defendants to those rights afforded under the California Constitution. 229 In summarizing previous decisions in which the court applied Proposition 8, the
court restated the intention of California voters for Proposition
8 to abrogate "judicial decisions which had required the exclusion of relevant evidence solely to deter police misconduct in violation of a suspect's constitutional rights under the state constitution, while preserving legislatively created rules of
privilege."23o The court, in citing In re Lance W., concluded that
California voters believe, as shown by Proposition 8, that "the
exclusion of evidence is not an acceptable means of implementing those rights, except as required by the Constitution of the
United States."231 The Markham court's analysis of the exclusion of evidence under Proposition 8 shows how difficult it
would be for California courts to vary from the federal waiver
standard contained in Connelly.

Justice Mosk, in his concurring OpInIOn in Markham, revealed judicial dissatisfaction with the voter trend toward limit226. Id. at 70, 775 P.2d at 1046, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 278. See also infra note 223.
227. Id. at 66, 70, 775 P.2d at 1044, 1047, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 275, 278.
228. See infra note 223.
229. See infra notes 229-32 and accompanying text.
230. Id. (citing People v. May, 44 Cal. 3d 309, 748 P.2d 307, 243 Cal. Rptr. 369
(1988» (In May, the Court held that the rule announced in People v. Disbrow, 16 Cal. 3d
101, 545 P.2d 272, 127 Cal. Rptr. 360 (1976), which held that a statement obtained in
violation of a suspect's privilege against self incrimination cannot be used for impeachment under state law, did not fall under the exception in Proposition 8 for existing statutory rules of evidence relating to privilege. At issue was California Evidence Code section
940, which states: "To the extent that such privilege exists under the Constitution of the
United States or the State of California, a person has a privilege to refuse to disclose any
matter that may incriminate him." CAL. EVID. CODE § 940 (West 1991».
231. Markham, 49 Cal. 3d at 69, 775 P.2d at 1042, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 277 (citing In re
Lance W., 37 Cal. 3d 873, 887, 694 P.2d 744, 752, 210 Cal. Rptr. 631, 639-40 (1985».

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1991

31

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 21, Iss. 3 [1991], Art. 2

518

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 21:487

ing individual rights in California. 2S2 Justice Mosk cited federal
authority allowing states to expand individual rights beyond
those conferred in the Federal Constitution.233 Justice Mosk
stated: "The blame for the sorry situation in which we find ourselves must be placed squarely on Proposition 8. That ill-conceived measure has struck down California precedents on individual rights as it has encountered them in its path of
destruction."234 As shown by Justice Mosk's concurrence, at
least one member of the California Supreme Court is reluctant
to restrict state rights to those afforded by the Federal
Constitution.
In People v. Clark,23/!' the California Supreme Court noted
the trial court's determination that the defendant was mentally
competent to make a voluntary and intelligent waiver of counsel. 2S6 While the court stated it was unnecessary to decide the
waiver issue to resolve the case, the court noted that under Connelly, there must be evidence of police coercion for there to be a
violation of the Fifth Amendment. 237 Although the court follows
Connelly in requiring coercion for a Fifth Amendment violation,238 the Clark defendant, as in Connelly, did not lack the
cognitive abilities to effectively waive his rights. 239 This leaves
open the possibility that, as discussed above, Connelly does not
control where an individual lacks sufficient cognitive abilities to
effectively waive Miranda rights.
232. Markham, 49 Cal. 3d at 71, 775 P.2d at 1048, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 279 (Mosk, J.,
concurring) .
233. [d. (citing Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980), which
states that federal court decisions do not "limit the authority of the State to exercise its
police power or its sovereign right to adopt in its own Constitution individual liberties
more expansive than those conferred by the Federal Constitution.").
234. Markham, 49 Cal. 3d 63, 71, 775 P.2d 1042, 1048, 260 Cal. Rptr. 273, 280
(1989).
235. People v. Clark, 50 Cal. 3d 583, 789 P.2d 127, 268 Cal. Rptr. 399 (1990).
236. [d. at 614, 789 P.2d at 147, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 419.
237. [d. at 620 n.30, 789 P.2d at 152 n.30, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 424 n.30 (The Clark
court stated: "Defendant seeks to rely on his right against self-incrimination as an independent basis for exclusion of his statements. Since there was no state involvement or
compulsion in eliciting his statements, no violation of his privilege against self-incrimination occurred." (citing Connelly, 479 U.S. at 164 (1986»).
238. [d.
239. [d. at 614,789 P.2d at 147, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 419 ("The [lowerl court noted that
defendant was mentally competent to represent himself and to make a voluntary and
.
intelligent waiver of counsel.") (emphasis added).
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The appellate court in People v. COX 240 rejected a claim that
a statement should be excluded because defendant's mental condition precluded knowledgeable and voluntary waiver. The court
rejected this argument because it was impermissibly based on
Fifth Amendment grounds. 241 The court interpreted Connelly as
explicitly rejecting the proposition that a mental condition can
preclude knowledgeable and voluntary waiver of Fifth Amendment rights.242 The Cox court concluded that under the progeny
of cases interpreting Proposition 8, it is "obliged to follow federal precedent in determining admissibility of confessions or admission dependant upon the factor of voluntariness.24s We
therefore follow Colorado v. Connelly and affirm the trial court's
ruling of admissibility."2H Yet Cox acknowledges that California
may still exclude evidence under Proposition 8, even though
under Connelly the admission is not coerced. ulI Therefore, a
confession may be excluded if, for example, it is inherently unreliable or unfairly prejudicial under California evidentiary law.
Confessions by learning disabled juveniles could thus be excluded in this manner.
The California Supreme Court held that a learning disabled
defendant's Miranda waiver was voluntary in People v. Kelly.u6
240. People Vo Cox, 221 Cal. App. 3d 980, 270 Cal. Rptr. 730 (1990).
241. Ido at 986, 270 Cal. Rptr. at 733.
242. Ido
243. Ido at 986-87, 270 Cal. Rptr. at 734 (referring to People v. MacPherson, 2 Cal.
3d 109, 115, 465 P.2d 17, 21, 84 Cal. Rptro 129, 133 (1970); People v. Sultana, 204 Cal.
App. 3d 511, 522 n05, 251 Cal. Rptr. 115, 121 n.5 (1988); People v. Markham, 49 Cal. 3d
63, 67 n.3, 68, 775 P.2d 1042, 1044 n.3, 1045, 260 Cal. Rptr. 273, 275 n.3, 276 (1989); In re
Lance W., 37 Cal. 3d 873, 888-89, 694 P.2d 744, 753-54, 210 Cal. Rptr. 631, 641 (1985».
244. Cox, 221 Cal. App. 3d at 987, 270 Cal. Rptr. at 734 (1990).
245. Ido at 986 n.3, 270 Cal. Rptr. at 733 n.3 (citing Connelly, 479 U.S. at 166-67)
(The Cox court cited Connelly which states, in discussing inquiries into the state of mind
of a criminal defendant who has confessed,
"We think the Constitution rightly leaves this sort of inquiry
to be resolved by state laws governing the admission of evidence and erects no standard of its own in this area. A statement rendered by one in the condition of respondent might be
proved to be quite unreliable, but this is a matter to be governed by the evidentiary rules of the forum, (cite) and not by
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.").
246. People v. Kelly, 51 Cal. 3d 931, 950-51, 275 Cal. Rptr. 160, 171-72 (1990) (In
Kelly, the court held that the defendant, in asking "How do I proceed?", was seeking
clarification as to how to waive his rights, and was not expressing confusion about the
nature of his rights. The court concluded that defendant's waiver was knowing, intelligent, and uncoerced. Evidence showed that defendant's I.Qo was in the low-normal to
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The court stated "the litmus test of a valid waiver or confession
is voluntariness."247 The Court cited Moran as its authority for
its voluntariness litmus test: "The relinquishment of the right
must have been voluntary in the sense that it was the product of
free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or
deception. "248 Yet there is no reference to the second, equally
important Moran requirement - that "the waiver must have
been made with a full awareness of both the nature of the right
being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it."249 Moran states that the "totality of the circumstances
surrounding the interrogation"2C10 must reveal "both an uncoerced choice and the requisite level of comprehension" for the
waiver to have been effective.2CIl Although the Kelly court discusses the waiver only in terms of its voluntariness, the court
refers to both Moran requirements - that the totality of the circumstances determines whether the defendant knowingly and
voluntarily waived Miranda rights. 2C12 Thus, it appears that the
California Supreme Court does not consider the knowing and intelligent requirement as having vitality separate from the voluntariness analysis. The court ends its analysis with the voluntariness test prescribed in Connelly. Thus, under Kelly, a waiver by
a learning disabled juvenile could only be invalidated if held to
be involuntary due to insufficient cognitive abilities, as discussed
above in section (A) of the analysis. The court would not engage
in any analysis of whether the waiver was knowing or intelligent
unless there was evidence of coercion.
Recently, the Illinois Supreme Court, in People v.
Bernasco,21l3 stated that a valid Miranda waiver must be knowing and intelligent in addition to being voluntary. 2M The
borderline range, CAT-scans revealed atrophy of brain tissue, and had learning disabilities and attention-deficit disorder. None of this evidence was presented at the suppression hearing. The court stated that "standing alone such evidence does not establish that
the waiver was involuntary absent coercion." [d. at 951, 275 Cal. Rptr. at 172).
247. [d. at 950, 275 Cal. Rptr. at 171.
248. [d. (citing Moran, 475 U.S. at 421 (1986)).
249. Moran, 475 U.S. at 421 (1986).
250. [d. (citing Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. at 725 (1979); North Carolina v. Butler,
441 U.S. at 374-75 (1979)).
251. [d. (emphasis added).
252. [d. (citing North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. at 373 (1979)).
253. People v. Bernasco, 138 Ill. 2d 349, 562 N.E.2d 958 (1990), cert. denied, 111 S.
Ct. 2052 (1991).
254. Id. See also Nat'l L. J., Dec. 24, 1990, at 25, col. 4.
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Bernasco court includes in its analysis the second Moran requirement to its waiver analysis omitted by the California Supreme Court in Kelly - "The waiver must have been made with
a full awareness both of the nature of the right being abandoned
and the consequences of the decision to abandon it."21!1! The
court embarks on an extensive judicial analysis of the conflicting
signals regarding the knowing and intelligent requirement contained in Connelly and the United States Supreme Court waiver
decisions thereafter.2C!6 The court's analysis helps explain why
Connelly strongly implies that the only appropriate place for the
knowing and intelligent requirement is in terms of state evidentiary rules,m yet post-Connelly United States Supreme Court
cases deciding the waiver issue continue to speak in terms of
"knowing and intelligent" waiver. 2M

The Bernasco court stated that "Connelly merely means
that, in general, issues of intelligent knowledge are separate issues from issues of voluntariness."21!9 The court noted that Connelly did not overrule Moran's requirement that a Miranda
waiver be knowing and intelligent as well as voluntary. The
Bernasco court reasoned that Connelly merely analyzed the constitutional voluntariness component of a confession's admissibility and of a waiver's validity.260 The Bernasco court concluded
that where a confession is given in situations not requiring Miranda warnings (as in the first confession in Connelly), only voluntariness, rather than intelligent knowledge need be shown to
satisfy the federal constitution. Yet where a defendant confesses
after being given Miranda warnings (as in the subsequent confessions in Connelly), both intelligent knowledge and voluntariness remain as separate requirements. 261
In Bernasco, the juvenile accused had many traits in com255. Id. at 782 (citing Moran, 475 U.S. at 420 (1986».
256. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412 (1986); Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285
(1988); Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564 (1987).
257. Connelly, 479 U.S. at 166-67 (1986) (Voluntariness inquiries into a defendant's
state of mind separate from any police coercion should be resolved by state evidentiary
rules pertaining to reliability; such matters are not governed by the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause).
258. See, e.g., infra notes 69-75, 244 and accompanying text.
259. Bernasco, 138 Ill. 2d 349, 562 N.E.2d 958 (1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2052
(1991) (page numbers were not yet available when this article was published.).
260. Id. (citing Connelly, 479 U.S. at 167, 170 (1986».
261. Id.
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mon with a learning disabled juvenile. He had an I.Q. of 80, and
was reading and comprehending at the fourth grade leveL A psychologist testified at trial that the juvenile did not have the ability to understand the legal terms contained in the Miranda
waiver form he signed.262 The trial court noted he had substantial difficulty in understanding routine questions and was unable
to understand simple concepts while testifying. 263 The Court upheld the trial court's determination that the juvenile's lack of
cognitive abilities precluded knowing and intelligent waiver.264
C.

THE

Connelly

ADULT COERCION STANDARD DOES NOT ApPLY

TO JUVENILE PROCEEDINGS

As discussed above, the Connelly majority finds it inappropriate for the Supreme Court to make "sweeping inquiries into
the state of mind of a criminal defendant who has confessed"
unless the police use coercion in obtaining the confession. 26Ii Yet
the Connelly Court considered the voluntariness of a waiver by
262.
Ct. 2052
263.
264.
(1991).

People v. Bernasco, 138 Ill. 2d 349, 562 N.E.2d 958 (1990), cert. denied, 111 S.
(1991); People v. Bernasco, 185 Ill. App. 3d 480, 541 N.E.2d 774, 776 (1989).
People v. Bernasco, 185 Ill. App. 3d 480, 541 N.E.2d 774, 776 (1989).
Bernasco, 138 Ill. 2d 349, 562 N.E.2d 958 (1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2052

If intelligent knowledge in the Miranda sense means anything,
it means the ability to understand the very words used in the
warnings ... To waive rights knowingly and intelligently, one
must at least understand basically what those rights encompass and minimally what their waiver will entail. Here, defendant was found not to understand fundamental terms contained in the Miranda warnings of his rights, not to have been
able to form an intent to waive those rights, and not to have a
normal ability to understand questions and concepts. Such
findings, if borne out by the evidence, are sufficient to warrant
the conclusion that defendant did not waive his Miranda
rights knowingly and intelligently and hence to justify suppressing his confession.
The court cited as additional authority: Note, Constitutional Protection of Confessions
Made by Mentally Retarded Defendants, 14 AM. J.L. MED. 431, 432-33, 440-44 (1989);
Holtz, Miranda in a Juvenile Setting: A Child's Right to Silence, 78 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 534, 536-37, 546-56 (1987); Note, Now My Son, You Are a Man: The Judicial
Response to Uncounseled Waivers of Miranda Rights by Juveniles in Pennsylvania, 92
DICK. L. REV. 153, 168-171, 175-84 (1987); Berger, Compromise and Continuity: Miranda
Waivers, Confession Admissibility, and the Retention of Interrogation Protections, 49
U. PITT. L. REV. 1007, 1018-19, 1042-54 (1988); Note, Colorado v. Connelly: The Demise
of Free Will as an Independent Basis for Finding a Confession Involuntary, 33 VILL. L.
REV. 895, 907, 920-22 (1988».
265. Connelly, 479 U.S. at 166-67 (1986) (emphasis added).
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an adult, not a juvenile.
It is unclear whether the holding abrogates the heightened
scrutiny traditionally afforded juvenile waiver inquiries by
courts prior to Connelly.266 If the traditional protection afforded
juveniles under federal case law is unchanged by Connelly, then
waiver by juvenile offenders may be involuntary even absent police coercion. If the Connelly holding does not control juvenile
waiver determinations, then subsequently, California courts
would be free to follow MacPherson 267 and consider a learning
disability as a factor in determining the voluntariness of a juvenile waiver.268

Juvenile courts in California have not expressly commented
on whether the Connelly holding governs juvenile proceedings. 269 Yet juvenile courts may look toward criminal courts for
guidance on this issue. Criminal courts have narrowly followed
Connelly on the waiver issue. Yet both federal and California
courts have consistently applied heightened scrutiny when analyzing juvenile waivers.270 No court has yet held that Connelly
abrogates this heightened scrutiny.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Learning disabled juveniles are likely to lack sufficient cognitive abilities to effectively waive Miranda rights. Their lack of
cognitive abilities can preclude either voluntary or knowing and
intelligent waiver. The heightened protection afforded juvenile
waivers provides additional strength to the argument that in the
totality of the circumstances, a learning disability is a significant
factor in determining the validity of juvenile waivers.
266. See, e.g., In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); People v. Lara, 67 Cal. 2d 365, 432
P.2d 202, 62 Cal. Rptr. 596 (1967); In re Anthony J., 107 Cal. App. 3d 962, 166 Cal. Rptr.
238 (1980); See also infra note 14.
267. MacPherson, 2 Cal. 3d 109, 465 P.2d 17,84 Cal. Rptr. 129 (1970).
268. People v. Sultana, 204 Cal. App. 3d 511 n.5, 251 Cal. Rptr. 115 n.5 (1988) ("It
appears that under California Constitutional standards coercive police activity is not a
necessary predicate to finding that a confession was involuntary." Id. (emphasis added)
(citing, e.g., People v, MacPherson 2 Cal. 3d 109, 115, 465 P.2d 17, 21, 84 Cal. Rptr. 129,
133 (1970»).
269. See infra notes 210-11.
270. See infra note 14 and accompanying text.
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The Connelly decision is a significant departure from the
original protections afforded an accused by the Miranda Court.
California voters have used the ballot proposition process to further restrict criminal defendants' rights under the state constitution. Yet some courts are beginning to recognize the relationship between learning disabilities and juvenile Miranda waivers.
The Supreme Court of Illinois in the Bernasco decision is an
excellent example of judicial recognition of this relationship and
of harmonizing it with the Connelly coercion requirement. If the
Bernasco interpretation of Connelly remains unchallenged by
the United States Supreme Court, other courts may perceive an
avenue toward arriving at similar interpretations.
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